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Jaszi: Symposium: Comments On Panel 2

COMMENTS ON PANEL 2
PETER JASZI

These are wonderful papers. Like all real first-order scholarship, they
push you to think differently about things that you have previously taken
for granted. That is certainly the case for me. I spend a fair amount of time
these days driving between Washington, D.C. and its precincts of men in
marble and the Eastern shore of Virginia. On this drive, you work your way
out of the District past various looming stone objects and sprawling
building complexes named for Ronald Reagan. Eventually, you reach the
countryside where the sky grows big and land grows flat. And if you pay
very close attention, by the side of Route 50 somewhere near Cambridge,
Maryland, you may note a small marker placed by the Maryland Civil War
Centennial Commission, which indicates that you are passing near the
birthplace of Harriet Tubman—”The Moses of Her People.” As I was
reading Ann’s paper, I began to think about how we memorialize figures
like Ronald Reagan and Harriet Tubman, and I did what any self-respecting
American academic would do: I googled them together!
Eventually, something interesting came up: Wisconsin Assembly Bill
559 from 2005, directing the Wisconsin Department of Transportation to
designate the segment of US Highway 14, from the Wisconsin-Illinois
border to Madison, as the Ronald Reagan Highway, “in recognition of
appreciation of the public career of Ronald Reagan who served with
distinction for two terms as fortieth president and who subsequently
demonstrated grace and dignity in his struggle with Alzheimer’s disease.”
The same bill also directed the Department of Transportation to designate
the entire route in the state of State Highway 142, as the Harriet Tubman
Memorial Highway “in recognition and appreciation of the life of Harriet
Tubman and the leader of the movement to abolish slavery in the 19th
century, who led over three hundred slaves to freedom on the Underground
Railroad....” Initially, I was impressed. I remembered Wisconsin’s
progressive tradition and observed that while the legislature obviously was
under pressure to name something for Ronald Reagan, he got just a portion
of a highway. But Harriet Tubman, a true hero who was the counterweight
in this naming exercise, got an entire road. That’s true balance, I thought,
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or maybe even a bit better! Then I investigated further, taking advantage of
a wonderful web site which I recommend for you all, called “Wisconsin
Highways,” www.wisconsinhighways.org, which gives you the down and
dirty on all state roads.
I am sorry to tell you that even though Ronald Reagan only got part of
Highway 14, it turns out to be a really important highway, running for more
than 200 miles across the Midwest—a major artery feeding the Wisconsin
state capital. In fact, it is so important that another part of it (in a different
state) is actually named after Laura Ingalls Wilder—which is another story.
And every inch of Highway 14 to be found in Wisconsin, as it sweeps from
the Illinois border to Madison, belongs to the former President. By
contrast, Highway 122, the Harriet Tubman Memorial Highway, is a
somewhat less impressive proposition. For one thing, it is only 14.6 miles
long, end to end. And it is one of the four so-called “unanswered state
trunkline connections,” which were originally going to be connected into a
single road along the Michigan coastline, but somehow never were. So,
basically, this is a 15-mile road that goes from nowhere to nowhere! Thus,
the appearance of neutrality that was so attractive about this Assembly Bill
559 dissolved when I began to look more closely.
The papers on this panel deal with practices that we might initially
expect or assume to have a neutral character. The authors describe,
examine and probe to reveal the profound absence of such neutrality
(especially, although not exclusively, with respect to gender) in these
practices and their associated discourses. They do this, as I suggested
earlier, by using the vocabulary of embodiment. It’s a general shortcoming
of much of our legal scholarship that we don’t talk enough about bodies—
that we make such an earnest effort to distinguish between the corporeal
and the doctrinal. Criminal law, for example, is all about bodily restraint
and bodily display and the infliction of pains and punishment on bodies,
but we manage to discuss it, most of the time, in rarified and abstracted
vocabularies of procedural rights and constitutional limitations. Other
branches of scholarship have done a lot better with bodies than we have,
and that includes, of course, feminist scholarship. These papers impress, in
part, because they are part of an effort to bring various notions of
embodiment into the domain of legal scholarship.
Eileen’s paper provides us with a gendered account of the struggle over
access to medicine, something we tend to think about in terms of NorthSouth conflicts, but which exists within our society as well. She writes
persuasively—and poignantly—about how the outcomes of our IP system
are sometimes literally written on the human body, demonstrating that
patent protection actually reduces women’s ability to receive needed
treatment for breast cancer. In fact, Eileen points out, the operation of the
IP system has blunted the effectiveness of initiatives to achieve more
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scientific focus on and more governmental support for breast cancer
treatment. Rebecca’s paper reminds us of the disturbing effect that the
intrusion of the body may have on legal doctrine itself. She demonstrates
the ways in which public representations of the female body, reflecting the
male gaze, are privileged in fair use “transformativeness” analysis. She
also explores the ways in which another aspect of fair use analysis, the
assessment of market harm, elevates the significance of stereotypically
male modes of economic participation over stereotypically female ones.
She reminds us that how even admirable and useful aspects of intellectual
property doctrine, like fair use, may be built on unstable foundations of
embodied discrimination.
I started my remarks by channeling the Wisconsin State Assembly, and I
want to end by giving you the voice of the artist-transgressor Jeff Koons,
talking through an affidavit in the litigation between himself, on the one
hand, and a photographer named Andrea Blanche, on the other.1 The issue
is fair use, and (in particular) “transformativeness.” Blanche had taken a
fashion photograph which Koons had assimilated through repainting as part
of a larger composition entitled “Niagara.” And, here is what Koons said:
When I saw the article in Allure Magazine about cosmetics, certain
physical features of the legs of the model represented for me a particular
type of woman frequently presented in advertising. In this photograph, I
saw legs and especially elongated toes that were glossy, smooth, expertly
manicured, and dressed in very expensive and not particularly practical
sandals.... For Niagara, the painting, I removed these anonymous legs from
the context of the photograph, and totally inverted their orientation. I then
added these legs to other contrasting images of legs... and along with ice
cream, donuts and pastries, floated them playfully and ethereally above a
liberating landscape of grass, a waterfall and sky. In so doing, I
transformed the meaning of those legs (as they appeared in the photograph)
into the overall message and meaning of my painting. I thus suggest how
commercial images like these intersect in our consumer culture and
simultaneously promote appetites, like sex, and confine other desires, like
playfulness. This photograph is typical of a certain style of mass
communication. Images almost identical to it can be found in almost any
glossy magazine, as well as in other media. To me, the legs depicted in the
Allure photograph are a fact in the world, something that everyone
experiences constantly; they are not anyone’s legs in particular.
That’s interesting, I think, because although Koons is speaking literally
to the claim of transformative use of the photograph in his painting, he
nevertheless finds it necessary, nevertheless, to talk about the alienation of

1. Blanch v. Koons, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 26786 (2d Cir. 2006).
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the depicted body part from the model who sat for the photograph. And
this is, I think, another example—perhaps a useful one, perhaps not—of the
rich confusion that Rebecca’s paper reveals.
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